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FILLING IN THE GAAP:
WILL THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT
PROTECT INVESTORS FROM
CORPORATE MALFEASANCE AND




EDERAL regulation of transactions in securities emerged in re-
sponse to the stock market crash of 1929.1 The two significant
pieces of legislation are the Securities Act of 19332 (the "Securities
Act") and the Securities Exchange Act of 19343 (the "Exchange Act").
The focus of the Securities Act is "to provide investors with full disclo-
sure of material information concerning public offerings of securities in
commerce, to protect investors against fraud and, through the imposition
of specified civil liabilities, to promote ethical standards of honesty and
fair dealing. ' '4 The Exchange Act declares "securities prices are suscepti-
ble to manipulation and that manipulation precipitates, intensifies and
prolongs national emergencies like the depression that followed the stock
market crash of 1929." 5 The Exchange Act attacked the problems perva-
sive in the securities market that led to the 1929 market crash by making
manipulative trading practices illegal and by regulating other trading
practices. 6 Congress intended the Exchange Act to provide protection to
* Candidate for J.D. and M.B.A. joint-degree program at Southern Methodist Uni-
versity Dedman School of Law and Cox School of Business, December 2004.
1. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194-95 (1976) (discussing Securities Act
of 1933, 48 Stat. 74, codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77a to 77z-3.). See generally JOEL
SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET (Houghton Mifflan Co. 1982) (re-
counting the history of the relationship between the Commission and corporate finance
from 1929 to 1987).
2. Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a to 77z-
3).
3. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78a-78mm).
4. Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 195 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 1-5
(1933)).
5. Steve Thel, $850,000 in Six Minutes-The Mechanics of Securities Manipulation, 79




investors against "manipulation of stock prices through regulation of
transactions upon securities exchanges and in over-the-counter markets,
and to impose regular reporting requirements on companies whose stock
is listed on national security exchanges."'7 The desired effect of the two
acts was to restore investor confidence in the American capital markets
by establishing a fraud-free securities market, or at least the perception of
one.
The recent events in corporate America raise questions regarding the
success of the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Commission")
in protecting investors and assuring the integrity of the U.S. capital mar-
kets. In order to reestablish confidence in the stability of corporate
America, users of financial information need assurance that the informa-
tion on which they base their investment decisions is reliable, accurate,
and free of manipulation. Congress, in response to pervasive insider trad-
ing, corporate fraud, and the resulting market crash of 1929, enacted leg-
islation that changed the dynamic of securities regulation in America.
More than a laundry list of procedures and revolution in substance, the
resulting legislation signaled the aggressive stance and pivotal role of the
federal government in the regulation of securities.
Once again Americans are in need of reassurance from the federal gov-
ernment. Once again Congress has responded: over the summer of 2002,
Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOA).8 The SOA ad-
dresses a broad range of issues raised by the recent events in corporate
America. In general, the SOA focuses on two recurring themes charac-
terizing the corporate scandals: regulation of the auditing industry and
conflicts of interests within corporate America. But is the SOA anything
more than an attempt to quell investors' fear of continued misbehavior by
executives? Will the SOA have the teeth necessary to accomplish the
intended purpose? While the SOA adequately addresses the issues raised
by recent corporate scandals, the reactionary nature of the regulations
and the current status of accounting standards in the United States will
fail to prevent future malfeasance, in part because the enacted legislation
fails to limit the underlying influence: greed.
The remainder of the introduction discusses a few of the noteworthy
corporate scandals; provides a brief historical overview of regulation of
the accounting profession and auditing industry; and describes the contri-
bution of various corporate actors in the downfall of many large and once
reputable companies. Part II summarizes provisions of the SOA and
compares those provisions to a few of the corporate scandals and the ma-
jor issues raised by the scandals, such as conflicts of interests among the
parties responsible for the production of a corporation's financial state-
ments. Part III argues that even though the SOA provides a comprehen-
7. Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 195 (citing S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 1-5
(1934)).
8. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scat-
tered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
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sive response to the issues raised by the corporate scandals, the current
accounting standards and the existence of greed-for both money and
power-created by a capitalist economy will limit the effectiveness of the
SOA in preventing future malfeasance on the part of corporate execu-
tives and in the business community in general.
A. CORPORATE AMERICA SETS NEW RECORDS
The close of the twentieth century marked the end of the dot-com era
and a decade of economic and financial success. America's economy ex-
perienced ten years of unprecedented growth. Personal fortunes blos-
somed while the "American Dream" attained a new meaning. Economic
records were broken, companies beat the Street's estimates, revenue was
up, and shareholders were pleased.
Unfortunately the economic success of the early-to-mid 90s did not last
and with the end of the millennium around the corner companies began
setting new records. On the corporate side, Xerox claimed title to the
largest ever civil penalty levied by the Commission against a public cor-
poration for financial fraud.9 Waste Management grasped the title for
largest restatement of a company's financial statements, 10 but possession
was momentary: subsequently, "Rite Aid was forced to restate its pre-tax
income by $2.3 billion and net income by $1.6 billion."11 Enron laid claim
to the largest bankruptcy petition in American history,12 but similar to
Waste Management, the dishonor was brief: in July of 2002, WorldCom
surpassed Enron when it petitioned for bankruptcy, listing $41 billion in
debt.13 Accountants and auditors set records of their own. For the first
time the Commission ordered a foreign audit firm to pay a civil penalty
for a violation of auditor independence.1 4 The Commission also issued,
for the first time in twenty years, an anti-fraud injunction against one of
the Big Five 15 accounting firms, which also happened to be the largest-
ever civil enforcement penalty against such a firm. 16 The former account-
ing firm of Arthur Andersen can be tied to a significant number of the
9. Stephen M. Cutler et al., Practising Law Inst., Recent SEC Enforcement Cases
(Sept. to Oct. 2002), WL 1332 PLI/Corp 585, 591 (discussing SEC v. Xerox Corp., Lit. Rel.
No. 17,465 (April 11, 2002), www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr17465.htm).
10. Id. at 593 (discussing SEC v. Dean L. Buntrock et al. (Waste Management), Lit.
Rel. 17,435 (Mar. 26, 2002), www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr17326.htm).
11. Id. at 588 (discussing SEC v. Frank M. Bergonzi et al. (Rite Aid), Lit. Rel. No.
17,577, AAE Rel. No. 1581 (June 21, 2002), www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr17577.htm).
12. HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, SARBANES-OXLEY Acr IN PERSPECTIVE § 1:6 (Sept.
2003), WL SEC-SOAP § 1:6.
13. Id. In June 2002, WorldCom confessed to "overstat[ing] its income during 2001
and the first quarter of 2002 by $3.8 billion." Id.
14. Cutler et al., supra note 9, at 594 (discussing In re Moret Ernst & Young Account-
ants, Exchange Act Release No. 46,130, AAE Rel. No. 1584, (June 27, 2002), http://
www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-46130.htm).
15. The "Big Five" is a term referring to the largest five accounting firms. With the
demise of Arthur Andersen LLP, the "Final Four" remain.
16. Cutler et al., supra note 9, at 596 (discussing SEC v. Arthur Andersen LLP, et al.,
Lit. Rel. No. 17039, (June 19, 2001), Exchange Act Release Nos. 44,444, 4445, 4446, 4447,
and 4448, (June 19, 2001), www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr17039.htm).
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corporate scandals. 17 On a more personal level, Dennis Koslowski plun-
dered Tyco International for over $500 million.' 8 These cited incidents of
corporate malfeasance are but few of the many. t 9
B. ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING STANDARDS
From inception a corporation is required under the securities laws to
submit independently audited financial statements to the Commission.2 0
The financial statements of a corporation submitted to the Commission
are one of the "primary sources of information available to guide the
decisions of the investing public."''E  These documents, used by investors,
are the responsibility of management; but their objectivity, accuracy, and
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP") are
checked by an outside auditor.22 The competitive advantage and success
of the capital markets in the United States is buttressed by these "[high-
quality financial accounting and reporting standards. '2 3 Further contrib-
uting to this success is the confidence that investors place in the U.S. capi-
tal markets, 24 which stems from the "confirming role of audited financial
17. See, e.g., David Milstead et al., Quest's Tangled Web; Highly Questionable Deals
Involving Fiber-Optic Lines Helped Bring the Telco to the Verge of Bankruptcy. Quest and
Auditor Arthur Andersen Blame Each Other. Who Should We Believe?, RocKY MOUN-
TAIN NEWS, Oct. 2, 2002, at 16, 2002 WL 9115431 (Baptist Foundation of Arizona (prom-
ised to pay $217 million to settle suits claiming the auditor ignored fraudulent activity
resulting in significant losses); Enron (convicted for obstructing investigation regarding $1
billion of losses hidden in off balance sheet transactions); Global Crossing (fiber-optic
company under investigation for "allegedly entering into capacity swaps with Qwest and
others to inflate revenue and prop up stock"); Sunbeam (agreed to pay $110 million to
shareholders to settle a lawsuit alleging the audit firm helped inflate profits); Waste Man-
agement (agreed to pay $7 million civil fine to settle Commission charges that Andersen
"'knowingly or recklessly' approved false and misleading reports that inflated" earnings by
more than $1billion); WorldCom (audit failed to detect $7 billion in accounting
discrepancies)).
18. Anthony Bianco et al., The Rise and Fall of Dennis Kozlowski, Bus. WK., Dec. 23,
2002, at 64. Interestingly, Mr. Kozlowski was trained as an accountant and used his knowl-
edge to facilitate his fraudulent activities. Id.
19. See Cutler et al., supra note 9, at 587 ("In Fiscal Year 2001, the Division brought
484 enforcement actions.").
20. E.g. Securities Act of 1933, Schedule A (25)-(27), 48 Stat. 88, 15 U.S.C. § 77aa(filing of audited financial statement prior to registration of new stock); Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, § 13(a)(2), (b), 48 Stat. 894, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)(2) (2002) (filing of
annual reports); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14, 48 Stat. 895, 15 U.S.C § 78n (2002)
(filing of an audited financial statement in connection with proxy and information
statements).
21. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 810 (1984); see also FINANCIAL
ACCOUNTING FOUNDATION, 2001 ANNUAL REPORT, HIGH-QUALITY FINANCIAL REPORT-
ING 2 (2002) [hereinafter 2001 ANNUAL REPORT] (statement of Warren E. Buffet) ("Finan-
cial reporting ... is the beginning of every decision that we make .... We look at the
numbers, try to evaluate the quality of the financial reporting and then figure out what that
means for the bonds and stocks that we're looking at, and thinking of either buying or
selling.").
22. AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, AUDIT ISSUES IN REVENUE RECOG-
NITION 3, 31 (1999) [hereinafter ISSUES IN REVENUE RECOGNITION].
23. 2001 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 1.
24. ISSUES IN REVENUE RECOGNITION, supra note 22, at 1.
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statements." 25
Investors, creditors, and other users of financial statements rely on the
availability of transparent, credible, and comparable financial informa-
tion. "Investors use financial information to assess operating results,
make judgments about probable future performance, and evaluate non-
accounting factors ... of [an] enterprise .... Thus one of the greatest
risks to investors is the risk that the financial information upon which
they rely is materially misstated. ' 26 The reasons for material misstate-
ments in financial statements are numerous, ranging from outright fraud
on the part of management to a misunderstanding of how to apply
GAAP.27
To ensure comparability, reliability, and materiality of the financial
statements of a company, the statements must be prepared in accordance
with GAAP, and auditors must adhere to the generally accepted auditing
standards (GAAS). 28 GAAS provides the procedures, and GAAP pro-
vides the substance.
1. History of the Development and Enforcement of Accounting and
Auditing Standards
While the Commission may have the authority to do so, 29 it does not
create GAAP.30 Rather, this responsibility has been delegated to various
private organizations since the inception of federal regulation of the se-
curities markets.31 Between 1936 and 1959, the Committee on Account-
ing Procedure of the American Institute of Certified Public Accounts
established the first financial reporting and accounting standards. 32 Be-
ginning in 1959 the Accounting Principles Board, which is also a part of
the AICPA, assumed the role of standard-setter. 33 The Financial Ac-
counting Standards Board (FASB), since 1973, has been designated as the
"private sector [organization responsible] for establishing standards of fi-
25. Id.
26. Daniel V. Dooley, Financial Fraud: Accounting Theory and Practice, 8 FORDHAM
J. CORP. & FIN. L. 53 (2002). "Financial statements are materially misstated when they
contain misstatements whose effect, individually or in the aggregate, is important enough
to cause them not to be presented fairly, in all material respects, in conformity with
[GAAP]." ISSUES IN REVENUE RECOGNITION, supra note 22, at 32.
27. ISSUES IN REVENUE RECOGNITION, supra note 22, at 3.
28. Id. at 31.
29. See, e.g., § 19(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 77s(a); § 13(b)(1) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78m(b)(1).
30. GAAP are "the conventions, rules, and procedures that define accepted account-
ing practices." Arthur Young, 465 U.S. 805, 811 n.7 (1984) (citing WALTER B. MEIGS ET
AL., PRINCIPLES OF AUDITING 25-26 (5th ed. 1973)).
31. For a thorough recount of the development of the institutions responsible for cre-
ating GAAP and their interaction with other organizations, see PELHAM GORE, THE
FASB CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK PROJECT 1973-1985, at 9-12 (Manchester University
Press 1995) (1992).
32. FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, FASB FACTS [hereinafter FASB




nancial accounting and reporting. '34
FASB issues Statements of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS)
and Statements of Concepts. 35 "Pronouncements of those predecessor
bodies remain in force unless amended or superseded by the FASB. 36
The standards promulgated by FASB govern the preparation of financial
statement reports and are considered authoritative by both the Commis-
sion and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. 37 Audi-
tors may also use non-authoritative sources in circumstances where no
authority clearly addresses a situation.38
The mission of the FASB is to "establish and improve standards of fi-
nancial accounting and reporting for both public and private enter-
prises."'39 Overseeing the FASB is the Financial Accounting Foundation
(FAF), which was organized in 1972.40
The Financial Accounting Standards Advisory Council (FASAC), with
more than 30 members, consults with the "FASB on the Board's technical
agenda, project priorities, issues likely to require the attention of the
FASB, selection and organization of task forces and other matters as may
be requested by the FASB or its Chairman."'41 The recently created
Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF) is responsible for identifying issues
that are ripe for FASB consideration. 42
The FASB focuses on "consumers-users of financial information, such
as investors, creditors and others. '43 The FASB attempts to "ensure that
corporate financial reports give consumers an informative picture of an
enterprise's financial condition and activities and do not color the image
to influence behavior in any particular direction. '44
2. Abuse of Accounting Standards
The means and ends vary, but the goal is the same: to produce financial
statements that encourage investment. To do so, as history repeatedly
illustrates, managers have been willing to manipulate financial state-
ments. The two financial statements subject to the most manipulation are
34. Id.
35. FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, FACTS ABOUT FASB 6, 7 (2002)
[hereinafter FACTS ABOUT FASB] (printable version), http://www.fasb.org/facts/in-
dex.shtml (last visited Nov. 14, 2002).
36. FASB FACTS, supra note 32.
37. Id.
38. ISSUES IN REVENUE RECOGNITION, supra note 22, at 22.
39. 2001 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 10. "Those standards are essential to the
efficient functioning of the economy because investors, creditors and other consumers of
financial reports rely heavily on transparent, credible and comparable financial informa-
tion." Id.
40. Id. at 4. The FAF "comprises 16 Trustees representing a broad range of profes-
sional backgrounds. Trustees share a common understanding of the importance of inde-
pendent, private-sector accounting standard setting to the efficiency of the U.S. capital
markets." Id.
41. Id. at 10.
42. See id. at 13.
43. Id. at 11 (statement of Edmund L. Jenkins, FASB Chairman).
44. Id. (statement of Edmund L. Jenkins, FASB Chairman).
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the balance sheet and the income statement. The balance sheet is a pic-
ture of a company's financial status on a given day. The income state-
ment provides financial information about a company for a specified
period. The preparation of financial statements must be prepared in ac-
cordance with GAAP. Illustrations of deviations from GAAP are nu-
merous, some simple, and others complex. 45
The web of financial transactions spun by Enron illustrates one of the
more complex methods of earnings management. In October 2001, En-
ron announced it would be taking a charge during the third quarter in
2001 of $1.01 billion in connection with write downs of failed investments,
resulting in a $618 million loss and reducing shareholder's equity by $1.2
billion.46 The next month, a press release issued by Enron and related
Form 8-K "disclosed that as a result of 'further review of certain related-
party transactions' the company and its auditors had determined that
based on generally accepted accounting principles its prior financial state-
ments since 1997 would have to be restated to take into account three
unconsolidated entities that should have been consolidated. ' 47 The as-
sessment in November 2001 was that the restatement would reduce net
income reported in years 1997-2001 by hundreds of millions of dollars.48
Myriad simpler tactics and schemes have been used to manipulate earn-
ings and the recognition of revenue over the years.
49
3. Accountants, Auditors, and Corporate Governance: Ultimate
Responsibility
Management, the board of directors, executives, the audit committee,
and the outside auditor are assigned certain responsibilities for the pro-
duction of quality financial statements, free from fraud and material mis-
statements. There is little doubt regarding the significant role
accountants and auditors played in the corporate calamity discussed
above, primarily due to the lack of independence between auditors and
their audit-clients. 50 Before assessing blame, critics must understand the
function of accountants, auditors, and the rules governing accounting
principles and auditing standards within the corporate governance
structure.
45. For a description of various frauds committed in relation to financial statements,
see Dooley, supra note 26, at 63-82.
46. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 12, § 1:1, WL SEC-SOAP § 1:1.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See Dooley, supra note 26, at 57-60 (listing common forms of misstatements found
in financial statements).
50. The most important rules governing accountants and auditors focus on auditor
independence and guard against an unconscious bias on behalf of the independent auditor.
DONALD C. COOK, THE CONCEPT OF INDEPENDENCE IN ACCOUNTING, ADDRESS BEFORE
THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ACCOUNTANTS (Oct. 3, 1950), reprinted in FEDERAL SECURI-
TIES LAW AND ACCOUNTING 1933-1970: SELECTED ADDRESSES BY MEMBERS OF THE SE-
CURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MEMBERS OF THE STAFF 198, 202 (Gary John




Ultimately, management is responsible "for the preparation and fair
presentation of financial statements, including reported revenues. '' 51 The
design, implementation, and effective operation of internal controls are
also management's responsibility.52 Simply stated, management should
prevent problems before they begin,53 which can be accomplished by es-
tablishing a corporate environment conducive to high-quality financial
reporting.54
The audit committee plays a critical role in the corporate governance
structure as "informed, vigilant, and effective overseers of the financial
reporting process. '55 If effective, an audit committee can deter improper
conduct on the part of management. 56 As part of the audit committee's
responsibilities, it should review the annual financial statements and con-
fer with the independent auditor and management about them; gather the
information an independent auditor is required to convey under auditing
standards; "assess whether the financial statements are complete and con-
sistent with everything else the committee knows; and assess whether the
financial statements reflect appropriate accounting principles. '57 But the
members of audit committees might not possess the experience or neces-
sary background in finance, accounting, or proper internal control
structures.58
The board of directors generally, and the audit committee particularly,
set the tone of the internal control environment. 59 The remaining board
members rely on the audit committee to "notice and question any unu-
sual business practices, aggressive accounting methods or violations of
the company's code of business conduct. '60
The independent audit has been described as a "public watchdog"
function. 61 "This 'public watchdog' function demands that the account-
ant maintain total independence from the client at all times and requires
complete fidelity to the public trust. If investors were to view the auditor
as an advocate for the corporate client, the value of the audit might well
51. ISSUES IN REVENUE RECOGNITION, supra note 22, at 3.
52. Id. at 6.
53. James W. Bean, Jr., Corporate Governance: The Audit Committee's Roadmap, 1-99
AICPA J. ACCOUNT. 47 (Jan. 1999).
54. ISSUES IN REVENUE RECOGNITION, supra note 22, at 3. Even if a set of written
rules is in place, a lax attitude at the top increases the likelihood of fraudulent financial
reporting.
55. Id. at 4.
56. Id.
57. Bean, supra note 53.
58. Id.
59. Internal control is defined as "a process, effected by an entity's board of directors,
management ... designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of
objectives including reliable financial reporting." ISSUES IN REVENUE RECOGNITION,
supra note 22, at 35.
60. Bean, supra note 53.
61. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 818 (1984) (noting that the
independent public accountant "owes ultimate allegiance to the corporation's creditors and
stockholders, as well as the investing public").
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be lost."'62 An audit must be conducted in accordance with GAAS. These
standards require an auditor to plan and perform an audit in such a man-
ner as to obtain a reasonable assurance whether the financial statements
contain material misstatements, whether the product of error or fraud.63
4. Analysts Fuel the Fire
Contributing to the meltdown of the U.S. securities market that re-
sulted in an $8 trillion loss of market wealth 64 were the conflicts of inter-
ests among the research analysts, investment bankers, and publicly traded
companies. Research analysts perform company-specific and market re-
search to determine and recommend actions that should be taken with
regard to a company's security.65 Traditionally, at large banks, the re-
search analysts are separated from the investment bankers and other
branches of the bank in order to assure their research and recommenda-
tions are not influenced by higher-ups in the banks with interests in the
companies the analysts researched. 66 As investigations into corporate
transgressions continue to unfold the problems created by conflicts of in-
terests within the banking industry become apparent. The complaint
against Enron added nine investment banks alleging that the banks pro-
vided bridge-financing to Enron SPEs, members of the bank held inter-
ests in the SPEs, and the analysts recommended Enron in order to
protect their investments. 67 Analysts at Salmon Smith Barney who con-
tinually issued a buy recommendation for WorldCom's securities are also
coming under fire.68
II. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE: THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT
Some commentators questioned whether there would be any legislative
response elicited by the bankruptcy of Enron.69 By March 20, 2002 con-
gressional members introduced more than 30 Enron-inspired bills. 70 The
subsequent troubles created by WorldCom's financial statements sealed
the need for action: 71 in July 2002, President Bush signed into law the
62. Bean, supra note 53 (quoting Arthur Young, 465 U.S. at 818).
63. ISSUES IN REVENUE RECOGNITION, supra note 22, at 31.
64. See Burton G. Malkiel, Remaking the Market: The Great Wall Street?, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 14, 2002, at A16, 2002 WL 3408627.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 12, § 8:1, WL SEC-SOAP § 8:1.
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., Manuel A. Rodriguez, Comment, The Numbers Game: Manipulation of
Financial Reporting by Corporations and Their Executives, 10 U. MIAMI Bus. L. REV. 451,
482 (2002) (predicting the then current administration would fail to enact meaningful
regulations).
70. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 12, § 1:9, WL SEC-SOAP § 1:9.
71. The complaint against WorldCom alleges that it "falsely portrayed itself as a prof-
itable business during 2001 and the first quarter of 2002 by reporting earnings that it did
not have." In violation of GAAP, WorldCom capitalized (and deferred) rather than ex-
pensed (and immediately recognize) $3.8 billion in costs. WorldCom intended to mislead
investors and manipulate its "earnings to keep them in line with estimates by Wall Street
Analysts." Cutler et al., supra note 9, at 587 (discussing SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., Litigation
2003] 2311
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Sarbanes-Oxley Act.72 The purpose of the SOA is to "protect investors
by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made
pursuant to the securities laws."'73 To further this goal, the SOA ad-
dresses many of the issues raised by the corporate scandals.74 In general,
the SOA focuses on regulating the accounting and auditing industry, sep-
arating and defining the role of the parties involved in the production of a
corporation's financial statements, increasing disclosure requirements to
improve information in the financial statements, and increasing liability
for those responsible for the production of a corporation's financial
statements.
A. PUBLIC COMPANY ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BOARD
Self-regulation of the accounting industry 75 coupled with a standard-
setting structure that is inefficient and easily influenced 76 contributed sig-
nificantly to the number of firms that had to restate their financial state-
ments. Remedy: the SOA authorizes the establishment of the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) "in order to protect
the interests of investors and further the public interest in the preparation
of informative, accurate, and independent audit reports for companies
the securities of which are sold to, and held for, public investors. '77 The
PCAOB will consist of 5 members appointed by the Commission.78 The
members of the PCAOB will be "prominent individuals of integrity and
reputation. '79 Further, the members must "have a demonstrated com-
Release No. 17,588, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release ("AAE") Rel. No.
1585 (Jun. 27, 2002), www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr17588.htm).
72. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scat-
tered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). This act also applies to any foreign public
accounting firm that prepares or furnishes an audit report. Id. § 106(a) (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 7216).
73. Id.
74. A cursory comparison of the SOA to media headlines illustrates the reactionary
nature of the SOA. Compare id. § 103(a)(2)(A)(i) (document retention), and id.
§ 103(a)(2)(A)(ii) (peer review), with Lee Walczak et al., Scandals in Corporate America,
Bus. WK., July 22, 2002, at 64, 2002 WL 9362406.
75. For a historical explanation of the development and education of the accounting
profession resulting in self-regulation of the accounting industry, see Harold Q.
Langenderfer, Membership Segments - Beyond Practice: Accounting Education's History -
A 100-Year Search for Identity, 5-87 AICPA J. Accr. 302 (May 1987).
76. The FASB has come under fire in recent months for not requiring the expensing of
stock options. This is after the FASB attempted to issue rules required the expensing of
stock options, but Congress, subject to pressure from the high-tech industry, threatened to
disband the FASB if such rules were issued. See ARTHUR LEVITT & PAULA DWYER, TAKE
ON THE STREET: WHAT WALL STREET AND CORPORATE AMERICA DON'T WANT You TO
KNOW 106-11 (Pantheon Books 2002).
77. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 101(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7211). "The Board shall be a
body corporate, operate as a nonprofit corporation, and have succession until dissolved by
an Act of Congress." Id. The PCAOB is not an "agent or establishment of the United
States government." Id. § 101(b) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7211). The SEC "shall have
oversight and enforcement authority of the Board." Id. § 107(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 7217). The PCAOB must file an annual report, including financial statements, with the
Commission. Id. § 101(h) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7211).
78. Id. § 101(e)(1), (4) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7211).
79. Id. § 101(e)(1) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7211).
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mitment to the interests of investors and the public, and an understanding
of the responsibilities for and nature of the financial disclosures required
of issuers ... and the obligations of accountants with respect to the prepa-
ration and issuance of audit reports with respect to such disclosures." 80
Under the SOA, the PCAOB is assigned various duties in order to reg-
ulate the accounting and auditing industry. The PCAOB must register
the public accounting firms8' "that prepare audit reports for issuers."'82
Once registered, the PCAOB must regularly inspect the accounting firms
and initiate "disciplinary proceedings concerning, and impose appropri-
ate sanctions where justified. '8 3 More general, the PCAOB has the duty
of enforcing "compliance with [the SOA], the rules of the [PCAOB], pro-
fessional standards, and the securities laws relating to the preparation and
issuance of audit reports and the obligations and liabilities of
accountants.
8 4
The PCAOB has rule-making authority regarding auditing standards, 85
and may adopt or establish rules pronounced by certain "professional
groups of accountants" that satisfy certain criteria.86 This authority is
subject to final approval by the Commission.87
Targeting specific weaknesses in the auditing process, the SOA requires
the PCAOB to adopt or establish certain rules. Generally, the PCAOB
must adopt or establish rules regarding independence, quality control,
ethics, auditing, and "other standards relating to the preparation of audit
reports for issuers."' 88 Specifically, the SOA requires the adoption of
80. Id. The SOA also places certain limitations on the qualifications of members.
Only two members may be or may have been certified public accountants (CPA); if the
Chairman is a CPA, that person may not have practiced for the past 5 years; members must
serve full time; no member may "engage in any other professional or business activity;"
and members may not "share in any of the profits of, or receive payments from, a public
accounting firm." Id. § 101(e)(2)-(3) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7211).
81. The term "public accounting firm" refers to "a proprietorship, partnership, incor-
porated association, corporation, limited liability company ... or other legal entity that is
engaged in the practice of public accounting or preparing or issuing audit reports," and any
"associated person" of such an entity. Id. § 2(a)(11)(A)-(B) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7201).
82. The SOA makes the preparation of or participation in the preparation or issuance
of any audit report with respect to any issuer unlawful if the person is not a registered
public accounting firm. Id. § 102(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7212). Once registered, ac-
countants must submit reports to the PCAOB on an annual basis. Id. § 102(a) (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 7212).
83. Id. § 101(c)(1)-(4) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7211). The Board also has the authority
to perform other duties that it determines are necessary for the effective regulation of the
accounting and auditing industry. Id. § 101(c)(5) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7211).
84. Id. § 101(c)(6) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7211).
85. See id. § 103(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7213).
86. Id. § 103(a)(3); see id. § 103(a)(4) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7213) (listing the re-
quirements an organization must possess before the PCAOB may adopt the standards is-
sued by that organization). Although the SOA does not specifically mention the FASB,
the Commission has designated it as a "professional group of accountants" satisfying the
listed requirements. Commission Statement of Policy Reaffirming the Status of the FASB
as a Designated Private-Sector Standard Setter, S.E.C. Release No. 4773, 80 S.E.C. Docket
139, 2003 WL 1956186 (Apr. 25, 2003).
87. Id. § 107(b)(2) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7217).
88. Id. § 101(c)(2) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7211).
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rules regarding document retention,89 limiting the ability of a single audi-
tor of a registered accounting firm from "managing" the earnings of a
client with unfettered discretion, 90 and the level of understanding an au-
ditor must have of a client's internal control structure. 91 An evaluation of
the control structure should "include maintenance of records" that reflect
the issuer's transactions in a fair and accurate manner and provide assur-
ance that the recorded transactions conform to GAAP.92 The auditor is
also required to report any weaknesses found in the internal control
structure. 93 Included with the quality control standards ultimately
adopted by the PCAOB shall be rules relating to "monitoring of profes-
sional ethics and independence from issuers on behalf of which the firm
issues audit reports; consultation within such firm on accounting and au-
diting questions; supervision of audit work; hiring, professional develop-
ment, and advancement placement of personnel; the acceptance and
continuation of engagements; internal inspection;" and any other rules
the PCAOB may establish.
94
B. DIVIDE, DEFINE, DELEGATE, AND DISCLOSE
In addition to creating the PCAOB, the SOA establishes rules regard-
ing auditor independence, 95 corporate governance, 96 civil and criminal
punishment for corporate fraud,97 enhanced financial disclosure require-
ments, 98 and regulation of analyst conflicts of interests. 99 These provi-
sions respond directly to conflicts of interests and apparent
misunderstanding of the responsibilities and duties owed to the investing
89. See id. § 103(a)(2)(A)(i) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7213) (requiring a registered firm
to "prepare and maintain for a period of not less than 7 years, audit work papers, and other
information related to any audit report, in sufficient detail to support the conclusions in
such report").
90. See id. § 103(a)(2)(A)(ii) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7213) (requiring a registered firm
to "provide a concurring or second partner review and approval of such audit report (and
other related information), . . . by a qualified person (as prescribed by the [PCAOBJ)
associated with the public accounting firm, other than the person in charge of the audit or
by an independent reviewer").
91. See id. § 103(a)(2)(A)(iii) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7213) (mandating an auditor to
"describe in each audit report the scope of the auditor's testing of the internal control
structure and procedures of the issuer").
92. Id. § 103(a)(2)(A)(iii)(ll)(aa), (bb) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7213).
93. Id. § 103(a)(2)(A)(iii)(lII) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7213).
94. Id. § 103(a)(2)(B)(i)-(vii) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7213).
95. Id. § 201(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(g), (h)) (prohibited non-audit services);
id. § 202 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(i)) (audit committee pre-approval of all services
offered by a registered public accounting firm to an audit client); id. § 203 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 78j-l(k)) (requiring rotation of audit partners).
96. Id. § 301 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)) (responsibilities of audit committees);
id. § 302(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7241).
97. The SOA's criminal provisions are located in Title VIII, the Corporate and Crimi-
nal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002, id. §§ 801-807; Title IX, the White-Collar Crime
Penalty Enhancement of 2002, id. §§ 901-906; and Title XI, the Corporate Fraud Accounta-
bility Act of 2002, id. §§ 1101-1107.
98. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 401(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(i)) (disclosures in peri-
odic reports).
99. Id. § 501(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-6).
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public by persons connected to the production of a company's financial
statements.
Arguably, the primary factor contributing to the large number of com-
panies restating their financial statements was the lack of auditor inde-
pendence. An auditor is under a public duty to approach an audit with a
certain degree of skepticism and is required to employ measures designed
to uncover fraud in the financial statements. 100 Conflicts of interests re-
duce an auditor's independence from the audit client and may prevent
the auditor from approaching the audit with the requisite mental state:
skepticism. As a consequence, the auditor fails his or her obligation
owed to the investing public. Arthur Andersen's audit of Enron illus-
trates well the consequences of not maintaining auditor independence.' 0 1
In order to ensure auditor independence, the SOA regulates the rela-
tionships among the parties involved in the audit.10 2 Focusing on the au-
ditor, the SOA limits the services that an auditing firm may provide a
client. If a registered public accounting firm provides auditing services to
a client, then the registered public accounting firm is forbidden from pro-
viding other services to the audit client.' 03 In addition to restricting the
types of services provided to an audit client, the SOA takes other mea-
sures to increase the presence of auditor independence.' 0 4
Related to auditor independence and requisite for investor confidence
are the financial statements of a company. Financial statements are
meant to provide investors and creditors with insight into a company's
financial status. A key principle providing accurate financial statements
is disclosure. By not disclosing all material information, a company's fi-
nancial statements do not paint an accurate picture of the company and
100. ISSUES IN REVENUE RECOGNITION, supra note 22, at 37-38.
101. Arguing that Andersen's audit team approached the audit of Enron with a skepti-
cal attitude is difficult considering that Enron paid Andersen around $30 million in fees for
non-audit services, which created a conflict of interest.
102. For a description of the parties to an audit, see discussion supra Part I.B.3.
103. Prohibited activities include "bookkeeping or other services related to the ac-
counting records or financial statements of the audit client; financial information systems
and design implementation; appraisal or valuation services, fairness opinions, or contribu-
tion-in-kind reports; actuarial services; internal audit outsourcing services; management
functions or human resources; broker or dealer, investment adviser, or investment banking
services; legal services and expert services unrelated to the audit; and any other service that
the Board determines, by regulation, is impermissible." Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 201(a)
(codified in 15 U.S.C. 78j-1(g)). In addition to the list of non-audit services specifically
forbidden, a registered public accounting firm may only provide non-audit services to an
audit client with pre-approval from the PCAOB. Id. § 201(a) (codified in 15 U.S.C. 78j-
1(h)).
104. See id. § 203 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(j) (requiring partner rotation no less
than every five years). This provision requires only the rotation of the audit partner, not
the rotation of the audit firm. The SOA does require that a study be performed regarding
the possibility of the mandatory rotation of auditing firms. Id. § 207 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 7232); see also id. § 206 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-i) (making it unlawful "for a regis-
tered public accounting firm to perform for an issuer any audit service ... if a chief execu-
tive officer, controller, chief financial officer . . . or any person serving in an equivalent
position for the issuer, was employed by that ... accounting firm and participated... in the
audit of that issuer during the 1-year period preceding ... initiation of the audit").
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mislead the users of those statements. As many investors have learned,
the numbers may not always be the most important factor to consider
when evaluating a company. Even if a company has stellar numbers in
the financial statements there is a risk that the numbers are tainted by
fraud and manipulation. Information regarding the corporate structure
of a company can aid an investor or creditor when making a decision
regarding the accuracy of the data contained in the financial statements
and stability of a company.
The SOA contains provisions regarding both the qualitative and quan-
titative information that a company must disclose. 10 5 The quantitative
disclosure requirements add little to increase the accuracy of the financial
statements.10 6 The qualitative disclosures provide investors and creditors
with information pertinent to investment and credit decisions. Directors,
officers, and beneficial owners are required to disclose the amount of
their equity interest in the issuer.10 7 The annual report must also disclose
management's responsibilities for implementing and maintaining "an ad-
equate internal control structure and procedures for financial report-
ing," °8 an assessment of the effectiveness of those internal control
structures, 0 9 whether the issuer adopted a "code of ethics for the senior
financial officers . . . or persons performing similar functions,"110 and
whether a financial expert sits on the audit committee." 1 The Commis-
sion is charged with evaluating the disclosures contained in the financial
statements.112
Under Title III, the SOA delineates the responsibilities of corporate
actors involved in the auditing process. Each issuer's audit committee is
105. Quantitative information relates to the numerical information found in the finan-
cial statements and information explaining how the numbers were calculated. Qualitative
information relates to the characteristics and structure of an issuer that affects the quality
of the quantitative information found the in the financial statements.
106. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 401(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. 78m(i)) (requiring compa-
nies to disclose and reconcile the financial statements with any correcting material adjust-
ments identified by a registered public accounting firm). Essentially, this section requires
an issuer's financial statements to conform to GAAP, which was required before the enact-
ment of the SOA. Moreover, the SOA does not decide the fate of the use of SPEs and off
balance sheet transactions, but requires the Commission to either conduct a study or issue
final rules at a later date. Id. § 401(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. 78m(j)); id § 401(b) (codified
at 15 U.S.C. 78m). The impact of these provisions will remain unrealized until the studies
are complete and the final rules are enacted.
107. Id. § 403(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78p(16)(a)(1)). Personal loans to executives
have also been prohibited, subject to certain circumstances. Id. § 402(a) (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 78m(k)).
108. Id. § 404(a)(1) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7262).
109. Id. § 404(a)(2) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7262).
110. Id. § 406(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7264); see also id. § 406(c)(1)-(3) (defining
code of ethics).
111. Id. § 407(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7265); see also id. § 407(b)(1)-(4) (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 7265) (listing requirements for a financial expert).
112. Id. § 408(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7266). The Commission, in determining
whether to evaluate the disclosures, will consider the issuance of material restatements;
significant stock price volatility; market capitalization; "emerging companies with dispari-
ties in price earnings ratios;" the affect of the issuer on the economy; or any other relevant
factors. Id. § 408(b)(1)-(6) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7266).
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"directly responsible for the appointment, compensation, and oversight
of the work of any registered public accounting firm employed by that
issuer."'1 13 Members of the audit committee must be members of the
board of directors; otherwise, they must remain independent. 14 Further,
they are forbidden from accepting "consulting, advisory, or other com-
pensatory fee from the issuer; or [from being] an affiliated person of the
issuer." 115 The audit committee is also responsible for establishing proce-
dures for "the receipt, retention, and treatment of complaints received by
the issuer regarding accounting, internal accounting controls, or auditing
matters; and the confidential anonymous submission by employees of the
issuer of concerns regarding questionable accounting or auditing
matters."" 16
The "principal executive officer ... and principal financial officer" are
responsible for certifying the annual and quarterly reports filed under the
securities laws. 117 By signing the report, the officer certifies that he or
she has reviewed the report;1' 8 that the report "does not contain any un-
true statement of material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary
in order to make the statements ... not misleading;"" 9 and that what the
"financial statements, and other financial information included within the
report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition and
results of operations of the issuer as of, and for, the periods presented in
the report.' 20 The signature also certifies that the signing officer is
responsible for establishing and maintaining internal controls; [has]
designed such internal controls to ensure that material relating to the
issuer and its consolidated subsidiaries is made known to such of-
ficers by others within those entities, particularly during the period in
which the periodic reports are being prepared; [has] evaluated the
effectiveness of the issuer's internal controls as of a date within 90
days prior to the report; and [has] presented in the report their con-
clusions about the effectiveness of their internal controls based on
their evaluation as of that date. 12'
The signing officer is also certifying that "significant deficiencies in the
design or operation of internal controls" and "any fraud, whether or not
material, that involves management or other employees" have been dis-
closed to the "issuer's auditors and the audit committee of the board of
directors."' 2 2 Finally, by signing the reports, the signing officers certify
that they have "indicated in the report whether or not there were signifi-
cant changes in the internal controls ... subsequent to the date of their
113. Id. § 301 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(2)).
114. Id. § 301 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(m)(3)(A)).
115. Id. § 301 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(3)(B)(i)-(ii)).
116. Id. § 301 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(4)(A)-(B)).
117. Id. § 302(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7241).
118. Id. § 302(a)(1) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7241).
119. Id. § 302(a)(2) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7241).
120. Id. § 302(a)(3) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7241).
121. Id. § 302(a)(4)(A)-(D) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7241).
122. Id. § 302(a)(5)(A)-(B) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7241).
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evaluation, including any corrective actions with regard to significant de-
ficiencies and material weaknesses."' 123
If an issuer is required to issue a restatement of its financial statements
due to the material noncompliance of the issuer, as a result of miscon-
duct, with any financial reporting requirement under the securities laws,
the chief executive officer and chief financial officer of the issuer are re-
quired to return "any bonus or other incentive-based or equity-based
compensation" the person received "from the issuer during the 12-month
period following the first public issuance or filing with the Commis-
sion . of the financial document embodying such financial reporting
requirement. '" 24 The CEO and CFO are also required to forfeit any
profit from the sale of securities of the issuer during the 12-month period
following the filing of the financial statements containing the
misstatement. 125
Even if financial statements provide all the material information of a
company's stability and are free from fraud and manipulation, investors
must still possess the faculties necessary to understanding financial state-
ments. In addition to comprehending the complicated information con-
tained in financial statements, performing market research is essential to
making a sound investment in a security. Research analysts at large bro-
kerage houses perform this research and can reduce all the information
into three recommendations: buy, sell, or hold. Problem: some analysts
own an equity interest in the shares they research creating a conflict of
interest and there are conflicts of interests between the research analysts
and investment bankers of the same brokerage houses. Solution: the
SOA requires the Commission to issue rules regarding conflicts of inter-
est among analysts "in order to improve the objectivity of research and
provide investors with more useful and reliable information.' 26 Any
rules that the Commission adopts should be designed to "foster greater
public confidence in securities research, and to protect the objectivity and
independence of securities analysts."' 27 To further this goal, the SOA
restricts the "prepublication clearance or approval of research reports by
persons employed by the broker or dealer" who are not directly involved
in the research, specifically forbidding those persons involved in invest-
ment banking activities.128 Persons involved in investment banking activ-
ities are also restricted from having influence over the performance
evaluation and compensation of research analysts. 129 The SOA further
isolates the analyst by forbidding retaliation against an analyst by an in-
vestment banker within the same brokerage firm for any "adverse, nega-
123. Id. § 302(a)(6) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7241).
124. Id. § 304(a)(1) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7243).
125. Id. § 304(a)(2) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7243).
126. Id. § 501(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-6(a)); see also id. (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o-6(c)(1)) (defining securities analyst).
127. Id. (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-6(a)(1)).
128. Id. (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-6(a)(1)(A)).
129. Id. (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-6(a)(1)(B)).
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tive, or otherwise unfavorable research report.' 130 The Commission is
responsible for developing additional rules to insure that the proper in-
formational barriers are established in the brokerage firms.13'
Research analysts are also subject to certain disclosure requirements
relating to potential conflicts of interest. The research analyst must dis-
close any equity or debt investment in the issuer; 132 any compensation
received from the issuer subject to the research; a33 and whether the issuer
subject to the report has been a client of the registered broker, and if so,
the types of services provided. 34
III. WILL THE SOA FILL IN THE GAAP?
Separation of ownership and control in the American corporation
draws a line between investors (owners) and those charged with running
the business (management, directors, executives). The line between the
two can blur, become a gap; an information-void. Within this gap, execu-
tives and directors can manipulate the system by decreasing the amount
and quality of information available to the public in order to distort the
public's perception of a company's financial status. This information gap
between the public and corporations is inherent to the American system
of corporations, and the ability of any regulation to completely protect
investors from fraudulent activities of executives is doubtful.
The problem is exacerbated when the checks on the financial reporting
system fail. The auditors and analysts, both required to provide the public
with objective information, were essentially working for the companies,
which increased the gap between the owners and management. Analysts
recommended securities in which they owned an interest. Auditors were
not really auditing, but were providing other services such as consulting.
The corporate compensation scheme created incentives to commit fraud,
which exists in many forms:
Generally, "badges" of financial fraud include: reported results that
do not comport with GAAP; pressures or incentives to commit
fraud-including pressure to achieve unrealistic operating results,
and incentive in the form of performance-based compensation (e.g.
stock options, bonuses or other forms of performance-based com-
pensation, the value of which is tied to achieving such unrealistic op-
erating results); opportunity to commit fraud-resulting from lack of
adequate controls, insufficient segregation of duties, or dominance-
by one or more individuals-over critical elements of the accounting
and reporting process; ... misrepresentations about, among other
things: (a) control activities having been performed properly, when
in fact that have not; (b) the true nature of transactions or account-
ing events; (c) management's true intent in respect of transactions
130. Id. (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-6(a)(1)(C)).
131. Id. (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-6(a)(3)).
132. Id. (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-6(b)(1)).
133. Id. (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-6(b)(2)).
134. Id. (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-6(b)(3)).
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being entered into; (d) the reasonableness and support for manage-
ment's judgments and estimates, when such are-in fact-known to
be unreasonable, or are lacking in valid support; or (e) false evi-
dence, misrepresented to be true and valid, regarding: absence of
side letters .... 135
Common financial frauds also include revenue recognition involving tim-
ing manipulation, revenue recognition involving the creation of fictitious
sales, manipulation of accounting receivables, revenue recognition involv-
ing irregularities concerning rights of return, and roundtrip revenue
frauds.' 36
In many instances the auditor is not purposefully aiding management
to perpetuate a fraud, and management is committing a fraud upon the
auditors. The purpose of such a fraud is to obtain an unqualified audit
opinion from the auditors,137 and to keep the auditors from knowing
about and disclosing the accounting irregularities. Fraud on the auditors
includes the following: misrepresentations by management;
"[c]oncealment of fraudulent transactions by falsification, alteration and
manipulation of documents . . .[s]ubordination of collusion to defraud
among management and/or employees . . . [c]ollusion with third par-
ties . . .[d]eceptions including planning the fraud to take advantage of
known (or anticipated) patterns of auditing ... [diestruction of evidential
matter and/or hiding key documents.' 38
Auditors are equipped with the tools and guidelines necessary to detect
fraud,139 but realistically, an auditor cannot design an audit to detect
fraud in every situation.14° The risk that fraudulent material misstate-
ments exist in the financial statements increases when the audit team fails
to perform auditing tests that were necessary at the time of the audit, and
in hindsight, would have detected fraud.' 41
The SOA provisions create rules reminding different sections of the
business community that they play a certain role in the American econ-
omy by redefining the positions, responsibilities, liabilities and obliga-
135. Dooley, supra note 26, at 62-63.
136. Id. at 62-75.
137. At the close of an audit and auditor renders an opinion on the quality of the finan-
cial statements. There are four types of opinions: 1) an unqualified opinion "represents the
auditors finding that the company's financial statements fairly present the financial posi-
tion of the company, the results of its operations, and changes in its financial position for
the period under the audit," in conformity with GAAP; 2) a qualified opinion represents
the auditor's opinion that the financial statements deviate from GAAP or they contain
material misstatements; 3) an adverse opinion reflects an auditor's determination that the
financial statements do not fairly present the financial status and operations of the com-
pany; and 4) a disclaimer of opinion expresses the auditors inability to draw a conclusions.
United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 818-19 n.13 (citing 1 AICPA, State-
ment on Auditing Standards §§ 510, 511.01 & 512-14).
138. Dooley, supra note 26, at 81.
139. See ISSUES IN REVENUE RECOGNITION, supra note 22, at 41-48 (describing tests an
auditor can perform).
140. Id. at 31
141. See, e.g., In re Arthur Andersen & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 17,878, 22 SEC
Docket 1346 (June 22, 1981), 1981 WL 30839, at *2-7.
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tions of the auditor, board of directors, audit committee, and analyst; and
that the economy can function properly only when various parties con-
duct themselves according to the rules of the game. Nevertheless, the
SOA may simply amount to mere threats and may fail to effectively per-
suade corporate actors to be mindful of their duties owed to investors.
Interestingly, the rules addressing intra-firm consultation, partner rota-
tion, and second partner review are not novel methods advocated to en-
hance the accuracy of financial statements. 142
The structure that existed pre-SOA created an information gap be-
tween investors and corporate America. As discussed, the SOA success-
fully addresses the weaknesses created by the then-existing structures
that permitted the Enrons and WorldComs to emerge en masse. The ef-
fectiveness of the SOA will not be revealed until some time after the
PCAOB has had time to organize, adopt standards, and commence effi-
cient operations. Unfortunately, the accounting standards ultimately
adopted by the PCAOB and the enforcement mechanisms created by the
SOA will fail to achieve the desired goal: a capital market free of fraud,
deceit, and manipulation. The SOA may be able to restore investor con-
fidence in what they perceive to be a securities market that is not as sus-
ceptible to fraud, deceit, and manipulation.
Beginning as early as 1920 the duty of a corporation's managers and
executives to increase shareholder wealth has been accepted legal doc-
trine.' 43 Conflicts of interests are created when the managers and direc-
tors interest in the company is directly related to the value of the
company's stock. Relating management's compensation to the value of
the stock price through stock options, for example, results in a significant
problem: the greed pervasive in corporate America and the belief that
even if caught, the punishment will be minimal compared to the potential
attainable wealth. The SOA does contain provisions increasing the crimi-
nal and civil liability for persons found in violation of the securities
laws.144 But the effectiveness of these provisions is doubtful. 145 The
SOA attempts to limit the structures increasing the risk of greed-moti-
vated decision-making and increases the stakes for those in management
that continue to play with the numbers in financial statements. The SOA
does not instill ethics in the leaders of corporate America and the ability
142. In 1981, as part of a settlement, Arthur Andersen agreed to implement programs
within the firm regarding partner rotation, second partner reviews, intra-firm consultation,
and continued education in accounting matters. Id. 1981 WL 30839, at *23.
143. C.A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibility: An Historical
Retrospective for the Twenty-First Century, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 77, 80 (2002).
144. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 802 (codified at 15 U.S.C § 1519); id. § 902(a)
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1349).
145. See Recent Legislation: Corporate Law-Congress Passes Corporate and Account-
ing Fraud Legislation-Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745
(codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.), 116 HARV. L. REV. 728, 728-
29 (arguing the deterrent effect of the criminal provisions in Titles VIII and IV will be
minimal because they merely echo the pre-existing criminal statutory scheme). The article
concludes that the increased sentencing provisions will increase the rate of guilty pleas but
provide no real deterrent effect. Id. at 734.
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of any legislation to do so is doubtful. While the SOA provides signifi-
cant reforms, any change is dependent upon the participants maintaining
high ethical standards. "This responsibility begins with today's business
leaders-chief executive officers, chief financial officers, and other mem-
bers of senior management. Good business ethics, along with a compen-
sation system that rewards ethical behavior, are critical to restoring and
reinforcing the public's confidence in our system. '146
The process of rebuilding investor confidence also requires trust in the
government organizations in charge. Confidence in the Commission and
the recently established PCAOB was questioned by the events surround-
ing the appointment of Mr. Webster to the head of the PCAOB. 147 Har-
vey Pitt's willingness to hide the truth from America is indicative of a
problem plaguing corporate America: dishonesty. President Bush needs
to appoint a leader who demonstrates ethics and honesty, someone who
can lead by example and set the proper tone at the top.
A recurrent theme in the literature discussing management's role in the
audit process is the importance of the tone within the company. 148 A lax
tone at the top results in a lax tone at the bottom, encouraging activities
that may result in low-quality financial reporting. A proper tone should
also exist within the agencies responsible for enforcing the securities laws.
The resemblance between the 1929 market crash and the most recent
downturn in the economy may be attributed to a relaxation in enforce-
ment and monitoring activities by the Commission and other organiza-
tions responsible for monitoring the activities of companies. Provisions
of the SOA greatly enhance the powers of the Commission to regulate
and monitor the financial reporting of registered companies. The Com-
mission, recently, is signaling a more aggressive enforcement of the secur-
ities laws. 149 To perpetuate the effectiveness of securities regulations, the
Commission and the PCAOB should the heed the warning, "[1]essen our
vigilance, of course, and we should be back to where we started."' 50
Encouraging good business ethics is difficult, and recent quarterly re-
sults demonstrate that regardless of the corporate scandals emerging at a
high rate and in light of the proposed regulations, corporations are still
spinning their numbers.15' The methods may be legal, but critics of the
accounting methods used by these corporations argue that the methods
146. 2001 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 5 (report of the FAF Chairman, Manuel
H. Johnson).
147. See Michael Schroeder, Webster Makes it Official and Quits Accounting Board,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 2002, at A3, 2002 WL 3411534.
148. See, e.g., ISSUES IN REVENUE RECOGNITION, supra note 22, at 4.
149. See, e.g., Charles Gasparino & Jerry Markon, Martha Stewart is Given Notice of
Possible Charges by the SEC, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 2002, at Al, 2002 WL 3409487.
150. ROBERT E. KLINE, JR., ACCOUNTING AND THE COMMISSION'S ENFORCEMENT
PROGRAM, AN ADDRESS BEFORE THE CHI CHAPTER OF DELTA SIGMA PI, JOHNS HOPKINS
UNIVERSITY, BALTIMORE, MARYLAND (Oct. 12, 1939), reprinted in FEDERAL SECURITIES
LAW AND ACCOUNTING, supra note 50, at 111.
151. David Henry & Heather Timmons, Still Spinning the Numbers, Bus. WK., Nov. 11,
2002, at 120, 2002 WL 100750179.
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are "out of step with the climate."' 152 Whether the accounting methods
employed by these companies are legal, the inappropriateness of their use
is clear. The problem with these financial statements is indicative of the
issues surrounding the rules-based accounting standards in the United
States. The rules-based approach allows accountants to comply with the
letter of the law but to ignore the spirit and purpose of financial account-
ing. By following the strict rules and ignoring the spirit of accounting
practices, accounting is used to conceal rather than to reveal the true sta-
tus of a corporation's financial stability-hardly a new phenomenon. 53
While effectively addressing many of the issues regarding the auditing
process, conflicts of interests, and independence, the SOA does little to
remedy the problems created by the current substantive accounting stan-
dards. The SOA does require the Commission to conduct a study on the
adoption by the United States financial reporting system of a principles-
based accounting system.15 4 The study will examine "the extent to which
principles-based accounting and financial reporting exists in the United
States; the length of time required for change from a rules-based to a
principles-based financial reporting system; the feasibility of and pro-
posed methods by which a principles-based system may be implemented;
and a thorough economic analysis of the implementation of a principles
based system. '155
The rules-based system existing in America has failed, no doubt; but
the question is whether the implementation of a principles-based ap-
proach will resolve the problems in the accounting profession and ac-
counting standards. Advocates say the simpler standards "will paint a
clearer picture for investors ... will allow auditors to focus on whether
the bookkeeping for a deal makes good business sense ... will put the
burden on corporate clients to prove that their aggressive accounting
meets the standard," and that "'[w]hat we've got now'. . . 'invites Wall
Street and others to create transactions that dot every 'i' and cross every
't,' but violate the intent of the rules and fuzz up what's really going
on." 156 Those opposed to the implementation of a principles-based ac-
counting system argue that a principles-based system will lead to a signifi-
cant increase in litigation against issuers and auditors.
Even if a principles-based accounting system is adopted, the success of
the securities laws is dependent on the accountant himself. The responsi-
bility of accountants and their importance to a successful securities mar-
ket has been recognized since the enactment of the securities laws:
152. Id.
153. ANDREW J. CAVANAUGH, STANDARDS OF DISCLOSURE IN FINANCIAL STATE-
MENTS, ADDRESS BEFORE THE MIDDLE ATLANTIC STATES ACCOUNTING CONFERENCE
(June 7,1941), reprinted in FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW AND ACCOUNTING, supra note 50, at
138.
154. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 108(d) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77s).
155. Id. § 108(d)(1)(i)-(iv) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77s).
156. Mike McNamee & Kerry Capell, FASB: Rewriting the Book on Bookkeeping: Will




In the light of our securities laws, the accountant has a responsibility
for financial information . . . important to the . . . opinion as to
whether a security should be bought or sold. The success . . . of the
basic principle underlying the Securities Act, that complete and fair
disclosure of all material facts should be made, is dependent on no
one more than on the accountant.1 57
This sentiment has been repeated over the years, 158 and is just as true
today. Accountants should perform their professional responsibility to
the investing public by providing the public with objective and accurate
information that will aid investors in their investment decisions.
IV. CONCLUSION
The circumstances surrounding the market crash in 1929 are disturb-
ingly similar to the circumstances surrounding the recent collapse of the
stock market and the downturn in the economy. Unprecedented growth
in the volume of securities-trading and record-setting economic growth
preceded both crashes. There was a limited amount of information avail-
able to investors and what was available was not necessarily accurate.
Subsequent to the revelation that the securities markets and corporate
America were rife with corruption, stock prices plummeted, fortunes
were lost, and investors lost confidence in the American capital markets.
The realization of pervasive insider trading crippled investors' confidence
in the market. The average investor, not privy to inside information, was
at a comparative disadvantage to those who managed and operated the
companies. During the roar of the twenties, the relationship between in-
vestors and the companies in which they purchased was seen as "we," not
"us and them." At a basic level, investors felt that the securities market
was unfair and the gap between investors and corporate America was
revealed. To close the gap, the government enacted regulations forbid-
ding insider trading and other activities in the securities market. These
laws could not guarantee a capital market free from fraud and manipula-
tion, but they did reduce the existence of securities manipulation. More
importantly, the regulations helped create a perception of a fraud-free
securities market and eventually restored investor confidence.
As the facts surrounding the demise of Enron, WorldCom, Arthur An-
dersen, and other large, once well-respected companies surfaced, the gap
between investors and corporations was once again revealed. Executives,
board members, and management failed in their responsibilities owed to
the shareholders of the corporation. Analysts recommended stocks, not
based on an objective evaluation of the company, but because they either
157. GEORGE C. MATHEWS, SEC ACCOUNTING ISSUES AND CASES, ADDRESS BEFORE
THE MILWAUKEE CHAPTER, WISCONSIN SOCIETY OF CERTIFIED ACCOUNTANTS (Jan. 8,
1937), reprinted in FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW AND ACCOUNTING, supra note 50, at 63.
158. See ANDREW J. CAVANAUGH, STANDARDS OF DISCLOSURE IN FINANCIAL STATE-
MENTS, ADDRESS BEFORE THE MIDDLE ATLANTIC STATES ACCOUNTING CONFERENCE
(June 7, 1941), reprinted in FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW AND ACCOUNTING, supra note 50, at
141.
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held a financial interest in the security or received pressure from above.
The auditors failed the investing public in every aspect. Auditing services
became secondary to, and less profitable than, the non-audit services that
the large accounting firms were providing audit-clients, effectively de-
stroying any possibility for the auditor to retain a skeptical attitude dur-
ing the audit. The lack of effective accounting regulations and standards
only aided the auditors and accountants in their ability to manipulate the
information contained in the financial statements. The impression of cor-
porate America is that everyone involved in the financial operations of
the companies was working together for their own financial benefit at the
expense of the investor.
The objective of the SOA is to restore investor confidence in the
American economy. The SOA seeks to achieve this goal by addressing
the specific factors contributing to the loss of nearly $8 trillion of stock
market wealth. First, the PCAOB has been established and ordained as
the regulator of registered public accounting firms. Many of the remain-
ing provisions share a common theme: demarcate, define, and disclose.
The SOA draws a distinct line between the parties involved in the audit-
ing process and delineates their duties, responsibilities, and liabilities dur-
ing the independent audit and for the resulting financial statements. A
barrier is also placed between the research analysts and the investment
bankers in order to increase the objectivity of their recommendations. If
a conflict of interest still exists among any of the executives, board mem-
bers, analysts, or auditors, then disclosures must be made in the financial
statements submitted to the Commission.
The SOA does not resolve the problems created by the existing finan-
cial accounting system in the United States. The GAAP contain nearly
100,000 pages of rules, pronouncements, standards, and principles.
159
Clearly the current system does not work, and accountants can easily ma-
nipulate GAAP to place a corporation in a more favorable light. Further,
many of the standards are confusing and difficult to apply in new situa-
tions. 160 The flexibility of GAAP allows accountants and auditors to ma-
nipulate earnings without violating the standards. A principles-based
approach may help alleviate some of the problems created by the rules-
based accounting standards, but neither system can completely close the
information gap between investors and issuers. Even with a perfect sys-
tem of financial accounting, the conscience of an auditor or accountant
remains the most significant check on the accuracy of financial statements
and is difficult to regulate. 16 1
159. McNamee & Capell, supra note 156.
160. Addressing accounting issues as they occur has been the philosophy of the Com-
mission and the standard setting bodies from the beginning. See MATHEWS, supra note
157, at 59-60.
161. During hearings on the Securities Act of 1933, General Carter, testifying on behalf
of the accounting profession, was asked if there was any relation between the corporate
comptrollers, who previously testified that they were responsible for the accuracy in the
financial statements, and the auditors. "General Carter answered: 'None at all. We audit
the controllers.' Senator Berkley then asked, 'Who audits you?' to which General Carter
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quickly replied, 'our conscience."' DONALD C. COOK, THE CONCEPT OF INDEPENDENCE IN
ACCOUNTING, ADDRESS BEFORE THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ACCOUNTANTS (Oct. 3,
1950) (emphasis added), reprinted in FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW AND ACCOUNTINC, supra
note 50, at 201.
